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BOOK REVIEWS
By George Picca. Paris: Presses Universitaires de
Paris, 1983. Pp. 127.

LA CRIMINOLOGIE.

Picca's work provides a clear, concise introduction to criminology. Although intended to reach a popular audience, La Criminologie
is a carefully documented, scholarly work written in an easily accessible style. Its basis is contemporary and historical European and
American criminological literature as well as the broader intellectual
tradition that shaped these ideas.
Picca defends criminology against its attackers who contend
that it is a pseudoscience, suggesting instead that it is a "reasoned
approach to the phenomenon of crime in society" (p. 22). But
crime has not always been approached systematically. As Picca
points out, the repression of crime long preceded any attempts to
study the phenomenon. The changing mores of our society, however, have influenced not only the evolution of our crime problem
but also our penal philosophy. Efforts are made to deal with crime
more effectively now, but Picca contends that we still do not know
the cost-benefits of our criminal policy.
Returning to the theme of societal development and change,
Picca points out the sharp differences between the crime patterns of
developing and developed countries. He cites the importance of industrialization in explaining the evolution of crime patterns and reflects on the growing problem of increasing marginalization of the
population in such areas as Latin America. For him, urbanization is
linked not only to large scale demographic movement but also to
industrialization, land speculation, and the rising expectations of
the newly arrived urban inhabitants. Their adjustment, however, is
impeded by housing, traffic, and health problems, as well as
problems of public order.
Picca focuses not only on the street crimes committed more frequently by the lower class, but also on the growth of white collar
crime. Although this concept was developed in the United States,
he applies it as well in the European context.
According to Picca, quantifying the problem of crime is impos1020
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sible. Most of the countries of Africa and Latin America have insufficient criminal statistics to make any assessment of their crime
problem. Furthermore, in those industrially advanced societies
where statistics are available, they are a reflection not of the crime
problem but of the justice system. As Picca states, "the statistical
documents do not have as their principal objective to inform us as to
the state of crime, but rather to measure the activity of the services
they provide" (p. 53). His cynicism with criminal statistics is even
deeper than this quote suggests. He views the increasing dependence of criminologists on criminal statistics as the principal measure of crime as a trend leading to the superficial analysis of social
phenomena.
For the highly quantitative researchers of the United States,
these comments might sound like the sour grapes of a theoretician
feeling excluded from contemporary research developments. But
Picca is not removed from the justice system and its statistics he so
criticizes. Rather, he is an insider in the justice system, more so
than most of his American colleagues. The European system permits a combination of the practitioner's career with that of the professor. While Picca teaches criminology at the University of Paris at
Nanterre, he is also an attorney general at the Cassation Court (the
French equivalent of the Supreme Court), a post he assumed after
years of directing penal research for the Ministry of Justice.
With this personal background, Picca's condemnation of the existing justice system carries particular weight. The growing problem
of crime is deplorable not only for its quantity but also for its impact
on individual lives. The fear of crime has affected the lives of many
citizens, particularly elderly women in France, who fall victim not
just because of physical weakness but also because of their physical
isolation. The justice system, however, is both uncertain and ineffective in its response. Mirroring the discussions in the United
States, Picca points out the conflicts in France between the previously entrenched commitment to the classical and neo-classical
schools and the more current social defense model. These intellectual arguments fail to mask the ineffectiveness of penal policy as the
prison riots of the United States, Italy, and France clearly demonstrate. Furthermore, the problems with confidence in the police are
particularly acute and disturbing, according to Picca, in a democracy
where the police should not represent an alien and hostile force to
the population.
What should be done in the face of all these problems? Picca
affirms that there is no "final solution" for the crime problem, but
rather, one must learn how to live with it. With our highly sophisti-
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cated society, is there any way to make this problem more endurable? As a lawyer, Picca searches for part of the answer in a revision
of the criminal law that would not only decriminalize certain behavior (abortion, pornography), but that would criminalize such new
activities as hostage taking. Echoing Beccaria, he cites the need to
ensure the certainty of punishment. Picca takes a sociological as
well as a legal approach. He suggests society must not be vindictive;
treatment must be provided for delinquents. Perhaps most important for Picca, however, is the sociopolitical context in which crime
is committed. There must be consensus on the part of society and
coordination with an improved justice system to limit the problem
of crime to tolerable levels. To promote this evolution, Picca contends that the discipline of criminology is needed.
Picca's work provides an excellent synthesis of continental and
American criminology. Avoiding the ideological debates of the discipline, La Criminologie provides a good introduction to mainstream
European thought on the subject of crime.
LOUISE SHELLEY
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR

SCHOOL OF JUSTICE
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

RESEARCH METHODS AND STATISTICS:

A PRIMER FOR CRIMINAL JUS-

AND RELATED SCIENCES. By RonaldJ. Hy, Douglas G. Feig,
and Robert M. Regoli. Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co.,
1983. Pp. 351. $23.95 (cloth).

TICE

The growth of science requires theoretical and empirical advances, but noting weaknesses in both domains, critics have suggested that criminal justice may represent (to borrow a phrase from
Mazur) one of the "littlest" of sciences. Research Methods and Statistics: A Primerfor CriminalJusticeand Related Sciences represents a significant effort to provide students with a foundation that will help
alleviate this malady, at least within the empirical domain. As the
title indicates, the book is basic in nature and generally draws its
examples from the academic arena most frequently identified as
"criminal justice." Descriptively, the title might be regarded by
some as misrepresentative of its contents, but to the extent that it is,
this could easily be remedied by reversing it to read, Statistics and
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Research Methods . . ., because the former do dominate. The 326
pages of text, supplemented by significance tables in the appendices, provide a comprehensive introduction to statistics. An instructor will do very well indeed to cover all topics and will need little or
no supplementary statistical materials. Depending upon the course
orientation, supplementary methodological materials might be
desirable.
Of the total thirteen chapters, seven address specific techniques
of statistical analysis. The initial six chapters provide the conceptual
background for this and summarize some salient methodological issues. Chapter one briefly discusses the scientific approach, but also
delves directly into fundamental premises and terminology of the
scientific method, including concepts, definitions, variables, and hypotheses. Although this opening chapter is very clear and concise, a
more gentle initiation to a research textbook might relieve the "research anxiety" that many criminal justice students experience. Students typically enter such courses, which are usually required, with
questions pertaining to their "relevance." This issue is only briefly
addressed in the preface, and some additional reassurance for students in encountering quantitative materials might be appropriate.
Also, the book is rather dry and devoid of humor, a style which does
not lend itself to relief of "research anxiety."
Chapters three through five deal primarily with methodological
issues. There are discussions of experimental and quasi-experimental designs, survey techniques, and secondary data analysis. Leading secondary data sources in criminal justice should have been
incorporated at this stage including, at a minimum, the Uniform
Crime Reports and National Crime Surveys. In addition, discussions of the central methodological issues concerning both victimization and self-report surveys are lacking. Reliability and validity
receive very detailed treatments, while the crucial topic of measurement levels is accorded less than three pages of discussion and very
few examples. Scaling techniques (e.g., Likert scales) are conspiciously absent, while the inclusion of sample questionnaires
would be useful as a pedagogical device. In the sixth chapter, samples and normal distributions are addressed, but not in a particularly lucid style. They are also not related to the practice of
hypothesis testing that dominates much of the book. This chapter
does provide a nice overview of sampling techniques.
Chapter seven can be viewed as reflecting a turning point in the
book. While some of the preceding chapters are marked by uneven
treatment and less-than-adequate illustrations of some issues, this
chapter on univariate analysis is virtually flawless. It is clear, con-
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cise, and makes copious use of examples from the criminal justice
literature.
Chapters eight through twelve provide very clear step-by-step
procedures for the calculation and interpretation of various statistics. One of the noteworthy strengths of this text is the manner in
which these chapters are founded on the conceptualization of hypothesis testing delineated in chapter two. Each of these five chapters is well organized, interwoven with cogent examples that
criminal justice students will find particularly relevant, and full of
numerous figures which are very effective as heuristic devices. For
example, Figure 13 of chapter nine provides a branch diagram
matching two-sample tests to research scenarios including the factors of level measurement, sample size, population distributions,
and independent versus matched samples. Tests presented in chapters eight and nine include one and two-sample (independent and
matched) T and Z, median, Chi square, Mann-Whitney, and the
sign. Chapter ten discusses contingency table analysis and includes
computational and interpretive guidelines for Chi square, Cramer's
V, Phi square, gamma, and tauc. Finally, chapter eleven provides a
thorough introduction to one and two-way ANOVA, while the final
two chapters provide an excellent introduction to correlation and
regression.
For the instructor seeking a criminal justice research text that is
more statistical than methodological, Hy, Feig, and Regoli offer the
best that is currently available. They have attempted to balance
methods and statistics, but it is the latter that are most noteworthy
in this text. This methods versus statistics dilemma reflects the current status of criminal justice curricula. The discipline has matured
to a level that introduction to some facet of research is commonly
required of undergraduate students. Yet most faculty experienced
in teaching methods and statistics conclude that both cannot be adequately introduced in a single course. To grow into the status of a
"bigger" science, criminal justice programs will need to provide a
broader empirical foundation for its students and this will require
treatment of statistics and methods in two distinct (or sequential)
courses. Until this dilemma in criminal justice curricula is resolved,
faculty must prioritize statistics and methods. If statistics are accorded priority, Research Methods and Statistics should receive serious
consideration as a text.
STEPHEN E. BROWN, PH.D.
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
EAST TENNESSEE STATE UNIVERSITY
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Two
THE SEARCH FOR REFORM.
ON SENTENCING:
volumes. Edited by Alfred Blumstein,JacquelineCohen, Susan Martin
and Michael Tonry. Panel on Sentencing Research, Committee
on Research on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice, Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, National Research Council. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1983. Pp. 804. $44.50

RESEARCH

Two justifications have been advanced for the punishment of
criminals: retribution and social utility. Retributivists hold that
punishment of the guilty is a moral end in itself, and that it is fitting
that a person who does wrong should suffer in proportion to his
wrongdoing. Utilitarians contend this is shortsighted, if not meanspirited. They hold that punishment is justifiable only as a necessary means to some future good. The good to which utilitarians
generally refer is crime control- rehabilitation, incapacitation, and
deterrence. While both views may be challenged on philosophical
grounds, only the utilitarian position is vulnerable to empirical refutation. In this regard, the theory of rehabilitation after dominating
correctional thinking for more than half a century, has in the past
decade faltered under empirical examination and now appears discredited. To the extent that the arguments for indeterminate sentencing and parole are premised on rehabilitation, they, too, are
facing strong criticism.
Signs of a new consensus on the aims of sentencing have yet to
appear. One can perceive, however, a national trend toward sentencing structures which narrow the discretion of prosecutors,
judges, and parole boards. To clarify the technical issues raised in
connection with the "sentencing reform movement," the National
Academy of Sciences convened a panel on sentencing. The panel's
task was to evaluate the sentencing research literature, to suggest
ways for improving its quality, and to identify directions for future
research. The report of the panel, entitled Research on Sentencing:
The Searchfor Reform, is presented in one volume. A companion volume contains eight papers commissioned by the panel to review selected topics.
In conducting the examination, the panel did not restrict its
view of sentencing to that of judicial action alone. Rather, it recognized that the decisions of prosecutors, probation officers, parole
and correctional administrators, no less than those ofjudges, determine the type and extent of punishment imposed. Sentencing reforms considered by the panel include the abolition or restriction of
plea bargaining, mandatory minimum sentences, sentencing coun-
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cils, the abolition of parole, parole guidelines, and "good time" provisions, although the panel's attention centered on two innovations
in particular: sentencing guidelines and statutory determinate sentencing laws. Estimating the impact of sentencing reforms on crime
rates, prison populations, and discriminatory and disparate case
processing presents a large number of conceptual and methodological problems. The panel opted here for a selective review of the
research literature to avoid duplicating the work of other panels of
the National Academy of Sciences.
Much of the impetus to limit discretion in sentencing arises
from two sources: (1) research findings of discrimination against
black and poor defendants; and (2) numerous findings of judicial
disparity, the sentencing of "like cases" differently. Evidence of racial discrimination, for example, often rests on multivariate analyses
that find correlations between race and the severity of sentence,
holding other relevant variables constant. A large percentage of unexplained variance in the same equation is usually interpreted as evidence of unwarranted disparity. Owing to the reliance on such
studies to help justify reform, the panel took a close look at the studies' methodological rigor. (The first three commissioned papers are
primarily devoted to this topic.) The authors conclude that the
studies are plagued by methodological flaws. Dependent variables
are mismeasured (e.g., sentence type and sentence length are arbitrarily combined in a single scale of punishment severity), samples
used to study case outcomes are unrepresentative, and control variables are either incompletely measured or not measured at all.
By far the most troublesome problem identified by the panel is
that of unobserved and, thus, unmeasured factors. It is generally
recognized that the variable of "offense seriousness" is the main determinant of sentence severity. It is also recognized that offense seriousness has many dimensions. However, most studies of judicial
sentencing rely on official case records and dockets to build measures of seriousness, even though court records are typically an impoverished source of data. Consequently, most measures of
seriousness only consider the original or final charge, the number of
counts, the statutory maximum penalties for each charge, or some
combination of these. Potentially important elements of the offense
that judges routinely take into account when formulating a sentence
are often unavailable to researchers using court records. These factors include the offender's role as principal or accessory, premeditation, abuses of authority or position, offender's mental or
psychological functioning, offender's drug or alcohol dependency,
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offender/victim relationship, victim provocation, vulnerability of the
victim, weapon use, bodily harm to the victim, and property loss.
The crucial question is whether there are significant correlations between any of the missing or poorly measured dimensions of
offense seriousness (which influence sentence severity) and an illegitimate but adequately measured variable, such as race. The correlation would lead to the "crediting" of race with some of the effect
on sentence severity that should rightfully be attributed to seriousness. Either an underestimate or an overestimate of the true extent
of discrimination could result, depending on the nature of the measurement error in seriousness (systematic v. random) and the sign of
the coefficients relating the omitted variables to race. If the measurement error in seriousness is uncorrelated with race, the parameter estimate for race will be unbiased; however, the estimate for
seriousness may be attenuated giving an inflated impression of sentencing disparity. The magnitude of the difficulties depends in large
part on the ratio of true to error variance in the measure of offense
seriousness. This ratio is presently unknown. For these and similar
reasons, the research scholars commissioned by the panel warned
that in the absence of more sophisticated methodological and statistical techniques, "the extent of discrimination in the criminal justice
system will continue to be mired in uncertainties so great that no
generally accepted resolution will ever be reached" (Vol. II, p. 122).
Further, "the techniques currently being used offer little hope of
providing a reliable basis for policy reform" (Vol. II, p. 174-75).
The cautionary words are ignored. They should have reminded
the panel that not only do we lack an adequate model of sentencing,
but we are also without even a firm conceptual grasp of the most
important determinant of sentencing: offense seriousness. These
words should have further warned that, in view of current knowledge, assessments of the effectiveness of sentencing reforms in reducing discrimination and disparity are perilous undertakings,
indeed. For example, the policy question of what constitutes reasonable latitude in fixing a sentence is closely bound up with notions of how to compare the gravity of different offenses. Generally,
the more "guidance" offered the sentencing judge, the fewer criteria deemed necessary to distinguish degrees of culpability and harm,
and the greater the tendency to simplify the difficult issues of disparity. The presumptive sentencing guidelines developed in Minnesota, of which the panel speaks highly, may serve as a case in point.
The Minnesota guidelines classify crimes into ten broad categories
ranked in order of their seriousness. Corresponding to each crime
category is a prescribed sentence or very narrow sentence range
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(which also depends on prior record). The loose-grained categories
mask numerous distinctions among offenses, and the tight penalty
schedule precludes fashioning sentences in light of those distinctions. Departures from the guidelines are permitted, but only under
"substantial and compelling circumstances"'- language to frighten
the souls of fearful judges. Why does the panel extol (albeit with
minor qualifications) the Minnesota system? We cannot be sure.
The panel sidesteps both the problem of discerning real disparity
(the unexplained variance not attributable to measurement error)
from the appearance of disparity in the sentences imposed before
the guidelines were promulgated, and the problem of reintroducing
disparity in a different form (e.g., dissimilar offenses receiving similar sanctions) after the guidelines were implemented. Consequently, the pre- and post-guideline comparisons are not very
instructive.
While the panel on sentencing research does not propose a specific remedy to the problems of disparity and discrimination, it does
suggest the superiority of legislative programs such as the one that
produced the Minnesota guidelines. More generally, the panel approves of programs that (1) narrowly limit the discretion of judges
and parole boards; 2 (2) use empirical data on past sentencing practices to inform policy choices and to project and accommodate future impacts, especially on prison populations; (3) include extensive
efforts to gain the support of the affected individuals and organizations; (4) anticipate and offset attempts to manipulate or evade the
reforms; and (5) employ credible review and enforcement
mechanisms.
Such an approach is laudable for many reasons. However, it
implicitly rejects, or at least discounts, the principal objection to doing away with all but token discretion in sentencing, viz., that a legislative classification of crimes3 simply cannot account for the
tremendous range of circumstances under which an offense may be
committed. Not that every crime is unique, or every classification of
1 MINN. R. CT. § II.D.
2 "Retributivists, given the high value they attach to the achievement of equality and

proportionality, would insist on narrow sentencing ranges" (Vol. 1, 170). Though the
panel does not openly embrace retributivism, its preference for narrow discretion is
clear. The panel, moreover, does not attempt a serious defense of the utilitarian posi-

tion and the "broad ranges that permit lengthy incarceration when incapacitative, deter-

rent, or rehabilitative considerations appear germane and relatively short incarceration
in other cases" (Vol. I, 164); the empirical evidence needed to justify differential or
disproportionate sentencing is simply not there (see below).
3 Included here are the classifications developed by administrative bodies (e.g., sentencing commissions) pursuant to legislative mandate.
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crimes is capricious. Penal statutes rightfully impose a degree of
conceptual order. But do we reduce disparity, or come nearer to
justice, when sentencing statutes define all the decision points they
possibly can leaving little or no room for the exercise of discretion?
Put more concretely, at what point is a statutory scale of offense
gravity sufficiently sensitive to the differences among offenses to dictate the exact, or nearly exact, punishment a particular offense deserves? Is this a matter of shifting opinion and ideology best left to
the legislature to decide? If so, legislatures, intent on reducing disparities, would likely grant discretion to sentencing officials in direct
proporiton to the perceived inadequacy of the offense classification
scheme. From this perspective, both broad and narrow discretion
can be consistent with the retributivist position.
In view of the doubts surrounding available estimates of disparity, it is strange that the panel, without caveat, and, indeed, without
supporting arguments, so readily equates sentencing equity with
narrow discretion. Surely the enthusiasm for inflexible sentencefor-crime system requires more in the way of justificaon than the
bare and unsupported assumption that the ideal of like punishment
for like offenses can be legislated into existence.
The concern over disparity and discrimination becomes all the
more important upon review of the literature on the impact of sentencing reforms on rates of crime. Though the report of the panel
does not indicate what is to be found in that literature, we are reminded that the issues of deterrence and incapacitation have been
4
addressed by another panel of the National Academy of Sciences.
The panel reports that the available research on the general deterrent effects of criminal sanction suffers from methodological weaknesses so severe that firm conclusions cannot be drawn. With
respect to collective incapacitation, the panel finds that only modest
impacts on crime are feasible but at the cost of extremely large increases in prison populations. And while selective incapacitation
policies offer the potential for greater crime control benefits, their
success hinges entirely on the ability to prospectively identify highrate offenders. This has yet to be accomplished. In sum, the utilitarian justification for punishment is, at this moment in history, without convincing empirical support.
This leaves retribution as the sole jusification for punishment,
4

See

DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION:

ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL

SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen & D. Nagin eds. 1978) (Panel on
Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects, Comm. on Research on Law Enforcement and Crim. Justice, Assembly of Behav. and Soc. Sci., Nat'l Research Council)

(Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1978).
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and the equal treatment for similar offenses as a goal of the highest
priority. But if one is careful to study the principle of retribution, it
is quickly learned that the concept of offense seriousness is murky,
multidimensional, and elusive of measurement. Nonetheless,
policymakers, often with the technical help of researchers, must
grapple with the problems of devising practical and politically acceptable sentencing structures. If we are fortunate, their results will
also be morally and technically defensible. For aid with several of
the important research issues, the report of the panel on sentencing
research (and commissioned papers) provides some of the finest discussions available in the literature. For a thorough analysis of policy
choices, one is advised to continue the search.

J.

DONALD
HARRIS, PH.D.
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
PENNSYLVANIA COURTS
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA*

JUST AND PAINFUL:

A

CASE FOR THE

CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF

By Graeme Newman. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983. Pp. 1, 163. $13.50.
CRIMINALS.

This is a book about criminal punishment. Like all too many
other works on this subject, it gives short shrift to the question of
whether or not we should punish, and focuses mainly on the
grounds on which we should punish and the forms that punishment
should take. It is devoted largely to arguments that punishment
should be made more painful and suggestions as to how that should
be done. Most controversy to date has been focused on the proposal to reinstitute corporal punishment, but the recommendations
with respect to imprisonment are equally as sensational.
Newman offers what I would characterize as a Macho Model of
punishment. He describes punishment as a "need," a need to settle
a score that is deeply imbedded in the meaning of justice. Citing
audience reaction to a scene in "Superman II," Freud, and ancient
mythology, he admonishes that we must have "the courage to give
our criminals the punishment they deserve" (p. 22). Newman effectively criticizes utilitarian sentencing theory, but he is an uncertain
and inconsistent retributivist. Except for the categorical assertion
that "there can be no justice without punishment" (p. 7), for justifi* The reviewer alone is responsible for the opinions here expressed.
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cation of punishment he points only to an educative function and
the need to satisfy irrational mass sentiment, both forward looking
justifications.
Here, as elsewhere, Newman's focus is so restricted that he fails
to give due consideration to alternative means of satisfying the interests he identifies. As an educator, Newman surely knows that
there are other ways, indeed more effective ways of educating, than
through pain infliction. He must recognize that there are ways of
resolving conflicts and responding to injury that provide satisfaction
to aggrieved parties short of taking the lash to the offender or
stringing him up from the nearest tree. He must have some appreciation that a view of justice that focuses only on issues of retributive
justice and ignores questions of distributive justice is a narrow view
ofjustice indeed. However, he does not bother to try to justify the
perspectives he chooses to adopt.
As for the grounds on which punishment should be allocated,
Newman holds that punishment should be retributive and distinguishes among three models of retribution. The "old retribution"
strives to match the punishment solely to the instant offense, making
no judgment against the person who committed it. The "new retribution" adds in some focus on the offender by arguing that a record
of prior crime makes the offender more blameworthy and thus deserving of more punishment than the instant offense alone would
merit. The "religious retribution" uses the nature of the crime or
the history of offenses as the basis for judging the offender to be a
"criminal" and an evil person deserving of the long suffering necessary to atone for his or her sins.
As to the nature or form of punishments that should be used,
Newman argues that retributive considerations require above all
that punishment be painful and of a nature that makes its painfulness clearly evident. Punishment should be simple to administer
and easy to vary in intensity so that the pain can be matched with the
particular offender's desert. It should be felt only by the one receiving it, who, after all, is the one who deserves it. Ideally, the punishment should "reflect" or "demonstrate" the crime, matching its
quality as well as its gravity. Yet punishment should not be barbaric
or involve torture.
Based on these philosophical models and punishment criteria,
Newman advocates a split system of criminal justice (actually a split
system of sanctioning), in which there would be two primary types
of sanctions, each aimed at a different target and based on a different philosophy. On one side of the system, acute corporal punishment would be employed to punish crimes on the model of the "old
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retribution." On the other side, chronic punishment would be used
to punish criminals on a "religious retribution" model.
Under Newman's system, acute, severe, immediate, public corporal punishment, usually in the form of electric shocks, would be
used to punish property crimes, strict liability offenses, and perhaps
some minor violent offenses. For violent crimes in which the victim
was terrified and humiliated, such as mugging, a violent and humiliating corporal punishment, such as whipping, could be considered.
Sentencing guidelines would be developed for selecting the kind of
corporal punishment and its intensity, frequency, and duration for
various offense categories and amounts of damage or injury done.
The lower threshold for the intensity of electric shocks would be
established on the basis of research measuring physiological responses to various levels of voltage. The aim would be to administer any shock at a level far above the lowest threshold of pain to
achieve a leveling of the degree of painfulness among persons having different pain tolerances.
Newman takes great pains to try to convince us that corporal
punishment is not evil, barbaric, or torture. He does this largely by
comparing electric shock to imprisonment and arguing that the latter is a far worse punishment. He describes imprisonment as a form
of torture. It is designed to place the whole person, body and soul,
in complete submission. It is mentally mutilating, drawn out, and its
pains linger even after release. It provides a social world in which
crime is actually expected and violence is rife. He asks if reformers
can defend prisons as progress when "not a scrap of research in this
century has been able to say anything good about them at all" (p.
25). So what does Newman recommend with respect to imprisonment? Abolition? Doing away with this cruel and inhuman institution? No. He advocates making it worse.
It seems that Newman's simple, clean, impersonal system of administering acute corporal punishments on an "old retribution"
model is just the thing for punishing crimes of lesser or middling
seriousness. However, he holds that "[t]here is no criminal justice
system that would suscribe fully to the position of the old retributivists" (p. 54). This is because there are some persons who are
"bad" or "evil," persons who are "imbued with the aura of criminality" (p. 63). These persons warrant the label "criminal" and we
should strive to match them or their deeds through a punishment of
similar aura. Under his "religious view of retribution," we must go
beyond the particular offense "to the soul of the offender "and"
match the despicable criminal's sins with the punishments" (p. 68).
Imprisonment now provides close to the requisite level of hu-
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miliation, total control, and chronic suffering required for punishing
criminals (as opposed to individuals who have broken the law). It
can be made even more fitting if its pains are made more public.
Thus, prisons should be opened to frequent public tours. All features currently used to "water down" the experience of imprisonment, such as access to color televisions, typewriters, and minimum
security facilities, should be eliminated. To make sure that prisons
are extremely harsh places and satisfy the demands of a religious
retribution model, prisoners should be required to perform acts of
contrition, such as risking their lives in medical research. "Indeed,
going to prison should be like reaching a point of no return, like
descending into Hell" (p. 64).
The determination as to which people deserve prison as a punishment should be left to each community. Only they can decide
when they are "no longer prepared to put up with" a given person
(p. 75) and when a person has earned the label "criminal" by the
horror of a single criminal act or the terrible extent of his or her
past record. All first prison commitments would be for a flat fifteen
years. Second commitments would be for life.
Reading Just and Painful made me think of Johnathan Swift's
Modest Proposal,written in 1729. Swift's "innocent, cheap, easy, and
effectual" remedy for the problems associated with the starving
masses of Ireland was that a major share of well-nursed infants
should be sold at one year of age to grace the tables of persons of
quality and fortune as a special dish. Is Just and Painful intended as
satire?
Newman's "modest," conclusory style is often like Swift's, as
when he asserts, for example, that "the acute punishment of electric
shock is easily demonstrated to be superior in every respect to our
current punishment practices" (p. 41). I repeatedly had to back
track when I came to the numerous "thus we must conclude" type
statements in the book to see if I had missed something in not
reaching such a conclusion.
Surely Newman's tongue is firmly in cheek when he suggests,
with respect to "the broad range of choices" that would face a sentencingjudge in deciding how many volts of electricity to apply for
how many minutes or seconds over how many sessions, that "here at
last he or she will have some discretion worth using!" (p. 77). Perhaps he offers no rationale for advocating a return to a medieval
religious view of the criminal as depraved sinner because he is afraid
that some segments of the religious community actually might take
him seriously if given half an argument for doing so. Can Newman
be serious in suggesting that for purposes of the "old retribution,"
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the criminal laws should be rewritten "to remove the 'mental element' that is so often part of their definition" (p. 78) and to focus
only on the harms caused, implying that we would punish injury that
resulted from accident, duress, and self-defense equally with that resulting from criminal intent? Perhaps he recognizes that if we were
to delete mens rea from the elements of a crime we might just as
easily eliminate punishment from the definition as well. One could
almost conclude that Newman's true goal is abolition of the punishment system in its entirety.
Read as satire, however, Newman fails to capitalize fully on
some of the opportunities he raises for ridiculing our vices. For example, he notes the disproportionately high representation of
blacks in state prisons, commenting that the chances are that every
black in the country has at least one relative in prison and probably
more. This means, he tells us, that "blacks stand to gain more than
any other group" (p. 47) if corporal punishment is adopted as an
alternative to imprisonment. Indeed, he assures us, under his
scheme, all people-rich or poor, black or white, child or adult, man
or woman-"will suffer the same amount of pain. This surely fulfills
the requirements of equity and fairness" (p. 46). Here was an opportunity for great dust jacket material, saying something to the effect of: "Rejoice Black America! You're movin' on up! Some of you
are going to get the whip or the prod instead of chains and walls."
As satire usually does, the book offers fresh (some would say
peculiar) ways of looking at current problems. Concern for avoiding the use of new punishments merely as "adds on" rather than as
alternatives to incarceration could be addressed by abolishing all
prison terms of less than fifteen horrible years. The tendency to focus overly much on how many years of imprisonment should be prescribed could be overcome by eliminating discretion to set terms
other than at fifteen years or life. The trend toward transferring
juveniles to adult courts could be countered by subjecting children
to electric shocks within the juvenile courts.
It is difficult to understand how Newman could so repeatedly
shoot himself in the foot by offering impassioned arguments that
undercut his own proposals unless this is a way of signaling to us
that he is not serious. He criticizes reformers who have focused on
the claim that incarceration can be reduced if only the small group
of dangerous offenders can be identified. He then offers the community's need to feel safe as a major criterion for who should be
imprisoned. He argues that once punished, the offender should be
regarded as having a clean slate. Yet he would identify those who
should be locked up partly by their prior records. He says that to
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punish with pain for utilitarian purposes is closely akin to torture
since there is no way to let up until the offender gives in and
promises to go straight. Then he justifies his life sentences by saying that far fewer prisoners should be let out "unless we are very,
very sure that they can keep their faith" (i.e., not break their
promises and recidivate) (p. 125).
Newman also does damage to his cause by limiting his examples
to ones that seem to make his case, while failing to consider equally
plausible alternative perspectives. That electric shock arguably may
be more humane or otherwise preferable to imprisonment does not
necessarily mean that we should use either. That pain should not be
regarded as inherently evil because it sometimes serves useful functions in nature (as in signaling illness or injury), does not support a
conclusion that we should seek to increase pain inflicted by the
state.
Just and Painful is a lively and provocative book that raises important questions about our goals and values. Unfortunately, the
merits of many of the critiques Newman offers of current philosophy
and practice are overshadowed by the inadequacies of the remedies
he proposes.
M. KAY HARRIS
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY

THE PARADOX OF CONTROL:

PAROLE SUPERVISION OF YOUTHFUL OF-

By Patrick G. Jackson. New York: Praeger Publishers,
1983. Pp. xxi, 149. $21.95.

FENDERS.

The Paradox of Control reports the findings of a study of the effects of parole versus discharge on youthful offenders. The study
was designed to test the effects of parole supervision on the subsequent criminal activity of the offenders and the consequences for the
offender of any violations that did occur.
The subjects of the study were parolees from the California
Youth Authority under supervision in the East Bay area of California. The parolees, who had been under supervision for between two
months and one hundred and twenty months, were randomly assigned either to be discharged immediately or to be retained for the
usual course of supervision. Outcomes of parole versus discharge
were assessed using as measures the number of subsequent arrests,
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the amount of time to pass before arrest, the types of offenses committed, and the sentences received for these later violations.
Research on the effectiveness of parole in deterring criminal behavior, despite a history of more than thirty years, has been severely
handicapped by methodological problems inherent to research on
this topic. Studies comparing criminal behavior of prisoners discharged to parole with criminal behavior of others retained until
completion of their sentences (and therefore subject to supervisionfree discharge) largely have been unable to account for important
differences which exist between the two populations.
Research that used techniques such as "failure risk scores" in
an attempt to create comparable groups for comparison' produced
ambiguous or negative results, thus casting serious doubt on the
less rigorous studies showing positive effects of parole. Random assignment to differing levels of supervision 2 and random assignment
to discharge at different lengths of time under supervision 3 also produced negative results, further undermining earlier positive results.
The experimental design of this study is a major step forward in
this line of research. Parole boards, which operate on the assumption that parole is a useful mechanism both for protection of the
community and for re-integrating offenders, have been understandably reluctant to approve research designs that require random selection of offenders to be discharged from parole. Of the 725
parolees available at the time of selection, only 43.3% (314 parolees) were permitted by the California Youth Authority Board to be
included in the study.
In spite of the limitations this sets on the interpretation of study
results, nonetheless, those results are rigorously arrived at and well
supported by the design and methodology of the study. To estimate
the effects of this precondition, Jackson has done extensive comparisons, not only of the study group versus excluded parolees but also
of the study group versus all parolees in the state at that time.
While there are some inevitable differences between the experimental parolees and other parolees, there are fewer differences than
might be expected. Furthermore, the results certainly are applicaI See, e.g., Gottfredson, Mitchel-Herzfeld & Flanagan, Another Look at the Effectiveness of
Parole Supervision, 19J. RESEARCH IN CRIME & DELINQ. 277 (1982); Waller, Parolefor the
Ex-Prisoner: Carrot, Stick or Illusion?, in THE FUTURE OF PAROLE 116 (D. West ed. 1974).
2 See, e.g., C. HUDSON, AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS OF
PAROLE SUPERVISION FOR A GROUP OF ADOLESCENT BOYS AND GIRLS: A SUMMARY (1972);
D. STARR, SUMMARY PAROLE: A SIX AND TWELVE MONTH FOLLOW-UP EVALUATION (1979).
3 See, e.g., D. JAMEN, L. BENNETt & J. BERECOCHEA, EARLY DISCHARGE FROM PAROLE:
POLICY, PRACTICE AND OUTCOME (1974).
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ble to the type of parolee most likely to be affected by changes in
parole policy.
The comparisons made between the experimental group and
the control group are extensive. A wealth of observations, set out in
tables in the book, are available for the interested reader. The tables, however, primarily contain frequencies and percentages and
only occasionally contain the actual outcomes of the statistical tests
performed. In some explanations the author is so brief that he
leaves unclear the exact nature and outcome of the statistical testing
done. Considering the thoroughness of the study methodology in
general, there is little reason to suspect that the statistical methodology has been neglected. However, a more complete reporting
would have enhanced the presentation.
The findings concerning the deterrent effects of parole, while
contradicting older research showing positive outcomes, provide
strong, credible support for the more recent questioning of parole
effectiveness. At the end of the twenty-six month follow-up (measured from the inception of the study), the majority of the measures
showed no significant differences between the subjects who were retained on parole and those who were experimentally discharged.
This included the percentage of subjects who were arrested and the
time that passed before an arrest. The offenses for which the parolees were convicted were found to be significantly more serious than
those for which the discharges were convicted. Jackson has systematically tested for and ruled out the most likely causes for any spurious results and presents a convincing case that, for the population
studied, parole provides no advantage over discharge in deterring
subsequent criminal activity.
The second major question addressed in the book is the effect
parole status had on sentences parolees received for later offenses.
Parole supervision is intended to benefit the parolee as well as the
community. There have, however, been indications in earlier research that when parolees do commit additional offenses, they are
sentenced more harshly than discharges are sentenced for the same
activities, regardless of prior history.
Jackson's study found strong confirmation of this hypothesis,
indicating that parole status is more likely to be a handicap than a
source of assistance. Parolees were more likely than discharges to
be sentenced to adult prison for personal crimes and serious offenses, and were less likely to receive probation for less serious
offenses.
This study is not directed at supplying the providers of parole
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with information about the effectiveness of differing types and levels
of parole supervision, although the extensive breakdowns by parolee characteristics do have potential value in that area. Its central
question addresses the effectiveness of the presence or absence of
such supervision. As such, its most appropriate audience consists of
practitioners and social scientists in the area of social policy who are
interested in the larger question of how best to protect society and
rehabilitate offenders.
The study is a significant contribution to the theory that parole
is not providing an effective return for the money invested. Jackson
suggests that the current system may be continuing out of inertia
and the lack of any other mechanism to reassure the public about
the dangers presented by discharged offenders.
For the most part the presentation of the study background,
methodology, and findings is clear and straightforward. In what is
perhaps an effort to streamline the presentation for the use of
policymakers, much of the relevant methodology is presented in appendices rather than in the text itself. It is strongly recommended
that these appendices be read along with the methodology chapter
as they form much of the basis for judging the validity and the appropriate applications of the findings. They allay many of the reservations that otherwise would cause the reader to qualify the study
results.
CATHERINE L. BUCK
INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, ANN ARBOR

CRIMINAL LAW AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION. By
Jan Gorecki. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983. Pp. x,
165. $26.00.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:

In 1972, the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia'
overturned existing capital punishment laws in the United States,
thereby commuting the sentences of nearly 600 men and women
then awaiting execution. The 5-4 majority argued that unbridled
jury discretion resulted in arbitrary and unconstitutional selection of
offenders for execution. Most states reacted to this by passing new
capital punishment statutes that either made capital punishment
1 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).

1984]

BOOK REVIEWS

1039

mandatory for certain categories of offenses or provided statutory
guidelines for exercising sentencing discretion in capital cases. In
Gregg v. Georgia 2 and its companion cases, the Supreme Court in
1976 rejected mandatory death sentences, but approved the guided
discretion statutes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas. In so doing, the
Court upheld the constitutional validity of capital punishment perse.
The vote was 7-2.
In Gorecki's view, the Furman decision was in line with the
ongoing social evolution of the United States, "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" (p.
1, quoting former Chief Justice Warren 3 ), but Gregg was a decided
step backward. Having rejected discretion in Furman, the Court embraced it in Gregg; having virtually eliminated capital punishment in
1972, the Court endorsed it in 1976. This seeming reversal is the
theoretical dilemma which Gorecki attempts to explain.
The early chapters describe the Furman and Gregg decisions and
the shifting Court alliances which formed them. This section is a
clear and useful description of these major cases. Gorecki nicely
captures the major issues brought forth in the Justices' agonizing
over this issue (there were nine separate opinions in Furman), but
does not digress into a full legal history of capital punishment decisions. He strongly 'criticizes the Court's reinstatement of discretion
in Gregg, contending that "the law of capital punishment seems to be
almost where it was in the years preceding Furman" (p. 19), and dismisses the new statutory guidelines as "not much more than window
dressing." However, he overstates the case, both in the incompatibility of the two decisions and in the post-Gregg return to the status
quo ante. For example, in the years following Furman and Gregg, the
proportion of blacks on death row has declined from approximately
50% to about 40%, 4 possibly suggesting a reduction in racial discrimination in capital sentencing. To the extent Gorecki overstates
these early arguments, the rest of the book addresses a non-issue.
The second, and longest section of the book addresses social
evolution and the psychology of law. The basic theme is simple:
"social evolution brings a tendency toward decreasing severity of
criminal punishments" (p. 31). There is a danger of tautology here,
but Gorecki avoids it-at a price. Social evolution is defined as a
directional social change, consisting of simultaneous growth in science, the arts, and the avoidance of socially harmful behavior. Such
2 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
3 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
4 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1983 (July 1984) (Bulletin of Bureau of
Justice Statistics).
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a definition is necessarily somewhat amorphous, but the societies he
discusses-ancient Athens and Rome and modem European countries-seem to fit his thesis.
I was disappointed with Gorecki's decision to restrict the concept of law to law in organized states. If he had used a more inclusive definition of law, such as Hoebel's, 5 anthropological
information could have been brought to bear on the thesis of social
evolution, and the thesis could have been enriched. For example,
one might argue that the social evolution of societies is typically curvilinear, with the low point in social evolution and the high point in
punishment severity both coinciding with the initial formation of the
6
state.
Gorecki's psychology of law is interesting and fairly novel. He
argues that as social evolution progresses, the restraining influence
of law is felt less through deterrence and more through moral education. Perceived certainty of sanction is required for both mechanisms, but the educative effect of law also requires that punishments
be generally perceived as just, that is, socially acceptable and proportionate to the offense. Thus, as social evolution progresses, capital punishment becomes
socially unacceptable
and
counterproductive for the educative influence of law.
In the final section, Gorecki attempts to explain the recent
hardening of attitudes toward criminals (as reflected, in part, in
Gregg) and to predict the future of capital punishment. He argues
that the decay of the criminal justice system causes an increase in
crime, which increases citizens' anger toward criminals, which in
turn results in more punitive judgments by the Supreme Court.
Thus, the failure of the criminal justice system subverts the tendency toward more lenient penalties which accompanies social
evolution.
The failure of the criminal justice system, in Gorecki's view, is
an abundance of discretion, which he finds especially objectionable
in plea bargaining. His prescription for the future involves the elimination of police and prosecutorial discretion (but retention of some
limited judicial discretion), making the law more certain and just.
This would enhance the moral education effect of the law, increase
compliance, reduce citizens' anger, and allow social evolution to
5 See E. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMmIVE MAN 27 (1954) ("A social norm is legal if its
neglect or infraction is regularly met, in threat or in fact, by the application of physical
force by an individual or group possessing the socially recognized privilege of so

acting.").
6 See, e.g., Diamond, The Rule of Law vs. The Order of Custom, in THE RULE OF LAw (R.
Wolff ed. 1971).
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proceed with the lessening of penalties, including the elimination of
capital punishment.
Gorecki's analysis in the final section is quite unconvincing.
First, he attributes the rising crime rate of the 1960's and 1970's to
the decay of criminal justice, but describes no change in criminal justice practices which would have produced it. He does not mention
that the baby boomers entered their teens and early twenties during
this period, which is probably a more potent explanation for the rising crime rate. Second, he does not acknowledge that the exercise
of police and prosecutorial discretion sometimes serves the ends of
justice, by fitting the case at hand to the desires of the community
and the limited resources of the criminal justice system. Finally, he
implies that the Supreme Court acts as a passive reflector of public
opinion, without fully considering the complexity of the matter.
Although I am not convinced by Gorecki's arguments, the book
has several strengths that should be acknowledged. Perhaps most
importantly, the argument is not as simplistic as it necessarily appears in the space of a brief review. In most instances, Gorecki acknowledges counterarguments and deals with them fairly. The
historical materials, particularly on Greece and Rome, are rich and
interesting. The book is well written and well documented, with
ample notes. Finally, Gorecki scrupulously keeps the discussion at
the level of analysis, rather than polemic. Given the intensity of arguments on capital punishment, this is an accomplishment in itself.
W. WILLIAM MINOR
NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

Peter Schaf and Arnold Binder. New York: Praeger Press, 1983. Pp.
vii, 254. $12.95.

THE BADGE AND THE BULLET: POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE. By

Violence in America is viewed by many as an historical tradition. Because our society is less restrictive than many others,
America is subject to more outbursts of individual emotion that
sometimes lead to violence. It is the duty of police officers to control millions of these individual personalities. What makes the officers' jobs more hazardous is the easy access to weapons. The
American historical concepts of individualism unrestrained by law
coupled with the concomitant access to weapons contribute to the
problem of controlling the use of deadly force by the police.
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According to the authors of The Badge and the Bullet, shootings
by the police are far less frequent than the public is led to believe by
the media. Generally, the use of deadly force by the police is sudden, occurs without preparation, under stress, and in a situation
where it is difficult for the officer to distinguish fact from fiction.
The authors stress that the number of shooting incidents can be reduced through proper training techniques. The proposed training
would consist of a step by step identification of potentially threatening situations through anticipation, entry, dialogue, decision to
shoot, and aftermath. If the officers are properly prepared in communication techniques, the authors claim that incidents in which
weapons are discharged will decrease.
In examining the traditional explanations for shooting incidents, the authors focus on the incident. They fail to address the
types of calls the officer received before the shooting incident, the
officer's personal life outside the department, and the type of beat
where the incident occurred. Many factors contribute to police use
of deadly force, only some of which are included in the incident.
The authors also fail to mention the impact that politics, interest groups, and local citizen groups have on either magnifying or
covering up various shooting incidents. What would be helpful in
the latter circumstances, and which is not available from police departments, is a documentation of incidents where the use of deadly
force was avoided. What frequently happens in incidents where
deadly force was avoided is that police administrators do not take
any action to avoid more public attention.
The authors have a distinct tendency to use undocumented
quotations throughout their presentation. The quotations were
used to make important points, but the source, the context, and how
and when the conversation occurred is left unspecified. A methodological appendix indicating who was interviewed, the content of
the interview, and how it was to be used in the book would have
been helpful. Although the book raises some interesting questions
about the use of deadly force by the police, it provides few answers.
KEVIN BARNEY
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF
CRIME, DELINQUENCY, AND CORRECTIONS
SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
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FEAR OF FEAR: A SURVEY OF TERRORIST OPERATIONS AND CONTROLS

By John B. Wolf. New York: Plenum Press,
1981. Pp. xix, 235. $22.00.

IN OPEN SOCIETIES.

John B. Wolf's FearofFearis an uneven review of the techniques
and tactics used by terrorist groups and the relevance of these techniques and tactics to the urban environment of the industrialized
democracies, and the anti-terrorism measures utilized by these allegedly liberal democracies. The treatment is uneven because of
three factors. First, Professor Wolf has an obvious conservative orientation, i.e., the book focuses on left-wing and nationalist groups
rather than right-wing state terror. Second, Wolf frequently generalizes without scholarly documentation or effort to differentiate between factions of umbrella organizations. For example, note his
comments on the Palestine Liberation Organization on page five or
comments such as, "All the contemporary left-wing American extremist organizations which are committed to violence and terrorism have been openly supported by the Cuban-directed
Tricontinental Organization, and have evolved from one or more of
the following organizations active in the 1970s: the Black Panther
Party, the Young Lords, the Chicano Liberation Movement, the
Weathermen, and the Puerto Rican Independence Movement (p.
13-14). Third, Professor Wolf uses inflammatory rhetoric and imagery, e.g., "groups led by men such as the 'Jackal' on the prowl" (p.
15) and "the membership roster of this collection of thugs listed
." (p. 14). Nonetheless, this volume remains an excellent but
blemished introduction to the study of contemporary terrorism and
counter-terrorism strategies and tactics.
Part I, Operations, reviews an alleged global terrorist coalition,
urban terrorist operations, organization and management practices
of urban terrorist groups, terrorist manipulation of the democratic
process, and the relationship of prisons, courts, and terrorism.
Quite frankly, I believe that Professor Wolf displays a thorough
knowledge of terrorist personalities, organizations, and strategies
and tactics; unfortunately, he is also at his very worst in this section
for the reasons noted above. This section, nonetheless, is well
worth reading and digesting.
Part II, Controls, is a thorough and interesting review of
counter-terrorism strategies utilized by allegedly liberal democracies, what Professor Wolf labels "free societies." He pays special
attention to anti-terrorism strategies and tactics utilized in Western
Europe and concludes Part II with a review of anti-terrorism intelli-
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gence limitations and applications and a framework for the study
and control of terrorism.
Part III, Appendixes, is a collection of chronologies, remarks,
and assorted other information on the Irish Republican Army, the
Baader-Meinhorf gang, the assassination of Aldo Moro, Islamic guerilla warfare in the United States, and the W.E.B. DuBois Revolutionary Army. Part III seems to be a page filler, yet an interesting
one for the serious or curious student of the study of political violence. This section appears to have no truly uniform theme yet it is
filled with interesting data.
In brief, John Wolf's Fear of Fear is a collection of thoughts,
opinions, and facts garnered by one of America's foremost students
of terrorism and political violence. I highly recommend it, scholarly
"blemishes" and all. It is a fascinating, easy-to-read review of terrorism strategies and tactics and the counter-terrorism practices utilized to control and eliminate them. It is far from a perfect
introduction to the study of terrorism. It at times lacks objectivity
and measured rhetoric, but is nonetheless encyclopedic, interesting,
and well worth the time and effort to read. It makes an excellent
supplementary text in a serious or cursory review of political violence and the measures utilized to quell it.
DANIEL

E.

GEORGES-ABEYIE,

PH.D.

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY

200 YEARS OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN NEW YORK. By Virgil
W. Peterson. Ottawa, Ill.: Green Hill Publishers, 1983. Pp. 543.
$18.95.

THE MOB:

Virgil Peterson, a former FBI agent, is well known in Chicago,
having been the executive director of the Chicago Crime Commission for 28 years. His first book, Barbarians in Our Midst (Little,
Brown, 1952), covered organized crime in that city. His second
book, The Mob: 200 Years of Organized Crime in New York, reports on
two centuries of organized criminal activity in New York. The work
consists of two parts and three appendices. The first 355 pages (of
this 543-page book) trace the history of politics and crime in New
York City up to the fall and imprisonment of Tammany Hall boss
Carmine DeSapio in 1969. The second part consists of a critical re-
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view of the testimony ofJoseph Valachi, and includes a summary of
Italian-American organized crime in New York into the 1980's. The
three appendices deal with the Mafia in Sicily: its origins, sources of
power, and structure. The book is extensively documented with
hundreds of endnotes.
Part one opens in 1789, the year George Washington was inaugurated President and the Tammany Society was formed in New
York. From its origins as a patriotic-fraternal society, Tammany
soon moved into the political arena and under the guiding hand of
Aaron Burr became a major political force in the city, the state, and
the nation. Burr, of course, became Vice President, narrowly losing
out to Thomas Jefferson for the top spot. Peterson notes that Tammany "resorted to devious means as well as outright fraud to win
elections and place its men in office" (p. 5). Of course this was necessary to circumvent laws that disenfranchised all New Yorkers except those who owned real property. Peterson chronicles the men
and the scandals of Tammany, their ties to notorious street gangs,
and looting of the city treasury. He points out that Tammany excelled in organizing the immigrant vote, but fails to explain why
these new Americans supported an obviously corrupt political
machine. Peterson presents a sordid picture of political-police corruption without offering any insight into the phenomenon. His style
and purpose seem designed to outrage rather than enlighten.
In fact, the Tammany district leader was usually a popular figure who in the days before social welfare programs provided important services to loyal constitutents-jobs, food, assistance with
public agencies including the police and the courts. To the impoverished slum-dweller, the only alternative to Tammany was usually a
"reform" movement drawn from the upper classes that had little but
contempt for "foreign elements." Peterson fails to recognize that
even without the use of voting fraud, Tammany would still have won
most elections. As Robert Merton notes:
The political machine does not regard the electorate as an amorphous,
undifferentiated mass of voters. With a keen sociological intuition, the
machine recognizes that the voter is a person living in a specific neighborhood, with specific problems and personal wants. Public issues are
abstract and remote; private problems are extremely concrete and
immediate.1
Pre-Prohibition "organized crime" consisted primarily of gambling, Sunday drinking, and, to a lesser extent, prostitution. These
activities were prohibited because a rural, Protestant, RepublicanI R.

MERTON, ON THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY

128 (1967).
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dominated legislature defined them as criminal. The Republicans
were able to maintain this domination by gerrymandering legislative
districts, a practice that was finally declared illegal by the Supreme
Court in 1962 in Baker v. Carr.2 The police and politicians were taking graft to permit activities desired by the Tammany masses. Similarly, Prohibition was the result of rural Protestant interests pitted
against urban areas with large immigrant and Catholic populations.
Organized crime in the syndicate style developed out of Prohibition.
However, Peterson places total emphasis on ties between Tammany
and gangster leaders-Prohibition is given no special treatment.
Instead of any attempt to explain, Peterson inundates the
reader with names and dates (e.g., page 140 mentions 14 different
persons). In one chapter (14), consisting of 28 pages, the reader is
informed about the election of Fiorello La Guardia, his efforts
against Frank Costello, Costello's deal with Huey Long to permit his
slot machines in New Orleans, the rise of Thomas Dewey and his
efforts against Dutch Schultz, Lucky Luciano, and Lepke
Buchalter-a truly encylopedic effort that is characteristic of the first
part of this book.
Part two consists of 89 pages and presents a critical analysis of
the testimony of Joseph Valachi. Peterson points out that this relatively insignificant member of the Genovese crime "family" was choreographed into the role of organized crime expert by federal
officials. Unfortunately, Peterson fails to provide any explanation,
or even speculation, as to why this was done. He notes that the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice in 1967 largely accepted Valachi's version of organized
crime, even though this version "is highly oversimplified and does
not jibe with known facts" (pp. 419-20). The reader must ask
him/herself why? Peterson provides no answer.
The author has brought together diverse and often excellent
sources of information into one volume. He includes virtually all of
the significant political-criminal actors in New York's history, as well
as important dates for anyone in need of such information. This is a
book that belongs in the reference section of any good library.
HOWARD ABADINSKY
SAINT XAVIER COLLEGE, CHICAGO

2 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

